BEIRUT: “We are in for a difficult time over the next five or six months, during which security incidents might happen,” Charbel told The Daily Star.
“But all security agencies have been placed on full alert to foil attempts to destabilize the country,” he said.
Lebanon has been rattled by a string of car bombings in Beirut’s southern suburbs and the northern city of Tripoli recently that have killed nearly 80 people and wounded over 500, in incidents directly linked to the 32-month war in neighboring Syria.
Last week, senior Hezbollah commander Hassan Hawlo al-Lakkis was murdered by unidentified gunmen outside his home south of Beirut, in an assassination the party blamed on Israel.
Lakkis’ assassination, which dealt a blow to Hezbollah in its stronghold, came two weeks after twin suicide bombings targeted the Iranian Embassy in Beirut, killing 30 people and wounding over 150.
The attack, which was claimed by the Abdullah Azzam Brigades, a Lebanon-based Al-Qaeda affiliate, raised fears that the Syrian conflict was spilling over into Lebanon, where political parties are sharply split in their support for the warring factions across the border.
Charbel’s remarks came shortly after the Lebanese Army arrested four Syrians possessing arms on the outskirts of the northeast border town of Arsal. The four were traveling in a vehicle from Syria.
The Army said in a statement that the car, which lacked a license plate, was stopped at a military checkpoint near Wadi Hmayyed in Arsal, adding that the four men in the car also lacked identification cards.
The Army said it confiscated weapons and a number of hand grenades from the vehicle and that the detainees were transferred to the appropriate judicial authorities.
Speaking to The Daily Star, a security source identified three of the men as Adnan al-Sheikh Abdel-Qader, Abdel-Aziz Barouk and Khaldoun Hussein.
The source added the car contained a motorcycle, a number of Kalashnikovs and 10 telecommunication devices.
Elsewhere, a police station checkpoint at Dar al-Baydar in east Lebanon arrested a Palestinian, identified only as Yasser K., wanted on charges of terrorism and belonging to a terrorist gang, the National News Agency reported.
Meanwhile, the Syrian army seized four Lebanon-bound explosives-laden vehicles in the town of Nabk in Qalamoun, a mountainous region where regime forces have been trying to root out rebel groups, Hezbollah’s Al-Manar Television reported.
The channel aired what it said was footage of an ambulance truck, two vans and a car that were rigged with explosives and rockets.
The report said the vehicles were prepared in Syria and were ready to be transferred to Lebanon via Arsal where residents are known to be staunch supporters of the Syrian opposition.
Arsal has also recently witnessed a large influx of Syrian refugees as a result of ongoing battles in Qalamoun between Hezbollah-backed regime forces and Syrian rebel groups.
A military official could not confirm Al-Manar’s report, saying the four vehicles were seized on Syrian territory.
“The Lebanese Army is on full alert at all crossings [with Syria] to prevent car bombs or gunmen from entering into Lebanon,” the official said.
Al-Manar also said the vehicle that was detonated outside the Iranian Embassy last month was rigged in the Syrian town of Yabroud.
Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov is expected to visit Iran next week
Con la “scusa ufficiale” della visita in Iran, la Russia guarda invece sopratutto alla Siria… La Siria infatti rappresenta un interesse economico per la Russia. Stiamo parlando di diversi miliardi di dollari in contratti. Per quanto rimanga un cliente relativamente piccolo, Damasco gioca un ruolo chiave nella sopravvivenza di alcune imprese russe. Nel 2011, secondo il Centre for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies, organizzazione no-profit russa che traccia le vendite di armi, la Siria rappresentava il 6% delle esportazioni di armamenti russi. Oggi, c’è chi ipotizza che sia arrivata al 10%, ovvero il terzo cliente per ordine di importanza. Gli interessi russi abbracciano anche il settore energetico. Contratti di lungo periodo sono stati siglati con Damasco per l’esplorazione e lo sfruttamento di riserve di gas naturale, complice il gasdotto “Arab Gas Pipeline” che collega l’Egitto alla Turchia e a un sito produttivo a 125 miglia a est di Homs. Complice la sua posizione in medio oriente e a un passo dall’economia turca bisognosa di energia, come pure l’Unione Europea poco distante, il gasdotto evidenzia il significato strategico della Siria. La base navale di Tarsus, in particolare, è l’ultimo avamposto russo nel Mediterraneo. I nodi che legano Iran e Siria, invece, sono soprattutto di tipo religioso e strategico. L’Iran, infatti, è il più popoloso stato shiita. La Siria è dominata dagli alawiti, affiliati agli shiiti e l’ultima cosa che Teheran desidera è una Siria controllata dai sunniti.
A visit to Iran by Foreign Minister of Russia Lavrov has been set for December 10-11,ˈ a Foreign Ministry spokesman told reporters.
The agenda for the trip includes topics concerning bilateral relations, regional problems and steps to resolve issues related to Tehranˈs nuclear program in light of the agreements that were recently reached in Geneva, he said.
Iran and world powers in Geneva last month agreed to freeze aspects of Iran’s nuclear program in exchange for a modest easing of the sanctions regime.
Iran has categorically and in countless occasions denied the baseless accusation that it is working to develop nuclear weapons under the cover of a peaceful nuclear program.
Russia has aided Iran, a key regional ally since the Soviet era, in developing nuclear power generation, and completed the construction of its only functioning nuclear power station at Bushehr.
Iran is to hold expert-level talks with major powers on its nuclear program next week in Vienna.
Source IRNA
UN set to deploy Libya force
L’Onu si prepara ad inviare una squadra di protezione per la sua missione a Tripoli, una mossa che sta innescando delle polemiche in alcuni ambienti libici…
La comunità internazionale é sempre più allarmata per la situazione di disordine interno della Libia. La preoccupazione si è manifestata concretamente la scorsa settimana con l’approvazione, da parte del Consiglio di Sicurezza dell’ONU, di una richiesta presentata dal Segretario generale Ban Ki-Moon, di inviare forze internazionali per proteggere il personale della missione di sostegno delle Nazioni Unite in Libia (UNSMIL).
The Security Council’s president for November, Liu Jieyi, who is also China’s ambassador to the UN, announced that on Wednesday 27 November, the council would send a 235-member special force to Libya to ensure the safety of UN staff and premises because of its lack of confidence in the ability of Libyan security forces to perform this function.
In his earlier letter to the Security Council, Ban Ki-Moon had written that UN staff in Libya are “at high risk of attack” due to worsening tensions and “the lack of reliable national security forces”, necessitating action to provide protection and security for them. The UN secretary-general said that in addition to safeguarding UN premises and staff and assisting in the evacuation of UN personnel and other foreign subjects in Libya, if necessary, a UN protection force could offer necessary support in the face of any attack carried out by extremists opposed to the presence of foreigners in Libya.
In view of the concern and anger that the announcement triggered among some political quarters in Libya, UN officials felt compelled to clarify the nature and purposes of the international security team. The Security Council approval of the request to send a force into Libya was not final, but rather an approval in principle, a UNSMIL statement said. It stressed that the scope of the force’s mission would not extend beyond the walls of the UN premises in Tripoli and that the UN would send an official letter to Libyan authorities notifying them of all the measures that require their necessary approval in accordance with relevant international customs and principles. The statement made no reference to the UN secretary-general’s letter, published by Agence France-Presse, and, specifically, to that portion suggesting that the UN security force could contribute to deterring attacks by extremists.
The Libyan Ministry for Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation felt compelled to issue a similar clarification. A statement published on the ministry’s website confirmed that the functions of the security team would not extend beyond the walls of UNSMIL premises and that the UN’s request to send a special force falls under the provisions of an agreement previously signed between Libya and UNSMIL. The statement pointed out that other diplomatic missions in Libya have also been granted similar treatment regarding the security and protection of their facilities and personnel.
In like manner, the director of the Foreign Ministry’s press and information bureau stressed that the functions of the UN security team would not extend beyond its assigned tasks and that under the agreement between Libya and the UN, the UN had a right to provide security for its mission in Libya if it feels it necessary.
Libyan security affairs expert Abdallah Masoud was among those who felt that there little cause for concern. “For the UN to send a team to protect its premises is not out of the ordinary,” he told Al-Ahram Weekly. “Foreign embassies also have the right to bring in guard teams from their home countries, on the condition that their tasks and activities do not breach international rules and conventions.”
Masoud pointed out that Libya had little choice in the matter as it still fell under the provisions of Chapter VII of the UN Charter. Nevertheless, he stressed that the UN guards would have to remain inside the premises, should wear civilian dress and should not be drawn from UN peacekeeping forces. He cautioned that if the guards were deployed outside of the premises they were charged with protecting, this would be interpreted as the beginning of another UN intervention in Libya and meet with stiff resistance on the part of Libyans opposed to any foreign security presence in their country.
Eissa Al-Tuweigar, former minister of planning in the interim government, took the occasion to hone in on the performance of UNSMIL itself. The UN mission has not fulfilled many of the tasks that brought it Libya, he said in an interview with the Weekly. While it did help with General National Council (GNC) elections, it was unable to help the GNC keep to the roadmap laid out by the Constitutional Declaration issued in August 2011 by the former Interim National Assembly. Nor could it help the government take the appropriate decisions with regard to how to manage the transitional phase.
Al-Tuweigar holds that UNSMIL and its tasks need to be reviewed. The mission “must provide real services that benefit the people. There is no need for large premises and so many guards,” he said, adding that it might be possible to dispense with UNSMIL altogether if Libyan officials decided to do so.
Like Masoud, Al-Tuweigar was concerned that Libyans might regard the arrival of a UN guard team as a form of foreign intervention, which would jeopardise national security. Nevertheless, he believes that the UN will study the matter closely before proceeding further.
It would appear that Libyan authorities have more than the arrival of a UN guard team to worry about. In a separate development last week, Prime Minister Zeidan announced that the government was under severe economic strains, may not be able to pay civil servant salaries, and might have to borrow in order to meet its financial obligations. He attributed the cash shortage to the 20 per cent drop in oil revenues due to a blockade of oil exporting ports in the central coastal area by advocates of a federalist system in Cyrenaica.
In a press conference earlier this week, Zeidan issued a stern warning to those responsible for the blockade of the oil ports and vowed that his government would “strike with an iron fist” anyone who approaches the oil fields. Backed by a strong current of popular sentiment that is increasingly worried by the growing power of the militias, Zeidan may have a chance to seize control of the ports from the militias and solve the economic crisis.
It therefore comes as no surprise that Libyan Army Chief of General Staffs Abdel-Salam Jadallah Al-Obeidi followed through on Zeidan’s warning with an appeal to the strikers in the oil facilities to end their sit-in unconditionally so that oil could flow into the ports again, enabling the economy to recover.
“The national welfare requires compromise so as to furnish the opportunity for the peaceful transition of authority without a political and security vacuum,” he said.
At the same time, he warned that Libya’s “social fabric, political life and economy were on a precipitous slope” and — referring to the militia threat — cautioned that “the world, which helped Libya during the fight for liberation, would not stand by with its hands tied as it watches the security coup in Libya.”
Meanwhile, in Benghazi, the largest city in eastern Libya, which is rich in oil and natural gas, army forces clashed with a militia group that, according to local residents, belonged to the jihadist Ansar Al-Sharia organisation. It was reported that four died and dozens were wounded in the battle.
On a more encouraging note, the first phase of municipal elections ever to be held in the country kicked off in Beida, Shahat, Al-Marj and Obari. Calm and order prevailed in these cities as citizens cast their votes for the first popularly elected municipal councils after the 17 February 2011 Revolution.
Source http://weekly.ahram.org.eg
Report: Eritrean military trafficking children to Sudan, Sinai
Traffico di esseri umani dall’Eritrea al Sinai: un fenomeno atroce che dimostra da anni come le autorità politiche e religiose dell’Eritrea, dell’Egitto, del Sudan e degli altri paesi coinvolti in questo barbaro commercio si mostrino indifferenti e spesso complici del crimine organizzato e dei movimenti terroristici, che traggono finanziamento proprio dalla vendita di armi, droga, esseri umani e organi.
A new report published on Wednesday claims that Eritrean and Sudanese military officers are jointly working on trafficking thousands of Eritrean children who are being held hostage for ransom in Sudan and further sold on to a trafficking network in Sinai, Egypt.
The report titled: “The Human Trafficking Cycle: Sinai and Beyond”, said Eritrea’s Border Surveillance Unit (BSU), which is under the command of General Teklai Kifle locally known as ‘Teklai Manjus’ is responsible for the human trafficking operations of children who, according to the report, are even as young as two or three years old.
Researchers, by Prof. Mirjam van Reisen, Meron Estefanos and Prof. Conny Rijken,
said the children are abducted and first smuggled to neighbouring Sudan where captives are asked to raise as much as 10,000 dollars or are threatened to be sold to Bedouin traffickers in Sinai.
The children, the report for the Europe External Policy Advisors alleges, are sold with the help of Sudanese military officers who collude with Sinai smugglers.
Once they are in the hands of Bedouin traffickers, the children are often subjected to torture and different forms of inhuman treatments so as to push their relatives to pay the demanded ransom.
An Eritrean opposition official on Friday told Sudan Tribune that if relatives fail to raise the money the children either are tortured to death or will be subjected to organ harvesting such as to the extraction of kidneys.
According to the report, between 2007 and 2012 up to 30,000 children were trafficked from inside Eritrea.
Many others were also kidnapped from refugee camps in Sudan.
An estimated 5,000 to 10,000 hostages have died in captivity. Many who managed to pay the ransom were also among the victims.
Among the several kidnapping incidents the report mentioned on the kidnapping of 211 children in October 2013 from a camp in Sudan.
Captors then demanded a ransom of $10,000 per head to release the children.
According to the study, some $600 million have been extorted in ransoms during the past five years.
Most of the children who are freed after the ransom payout are arrested by Egyptian security and are jailed indefinitely.
Every month, an average of 3,000 Eritreans cross borders to Sudan fleeing repression by regime in Asmara.
Currently there are nearly 100,000 Eritrean refugees at a camp in eastern Sudan.
The study by the Swedish and Dutch researchers was based on the interviews with 230 Eritreans who survived the trafficking and the torture in Sinai.
The report has been presented to the European Union parliament.
Source Sudan Tribune
American Teacher, Three Libyan Soldiers Killed in Benghazi
Un’intervista ad un alto funzionario dell’intelligence libica rivela che una delle conseguenze inaspettate dell’intervento francese nel Mali -diretto a reprimere la rivolta radicale islamica nel Paese africano, spingendo al al-Qaeda nel Maghreb a spostarsi a nord agli inizi di quest’anno- ha fatto della Libia la principale base del gruppo terroristico nella regione, aumentando l’instabilità di quello che è già un paese precario.
“La Libia è diventata il quartier generale del Qaeda nel Magreb”, ha affermato la fonte dell’intelligence, aggiungendo che solo nelle ultime settimane sono stati aperti tre nuovi campi di al-Qaeda nel sud della Libia.
Il rafforzamento della presenza del gruppo terroristico giunge nel momento in cui la Libia è reso instabile da una serie di minacce – o attacchi – contro obiettivo occidentali.
Three Libyan soldiers and an American teacher working in an international school in Benghazi, Libya have been killed today, Thursday, in a continued rise of violence in the country.
Unknown gunmen shot dead the American teacher as he was doing his morning exercise, according to an eyewitness account who spoke to Reuters.
The three Libyan soldiers were also killed by unknown assailants in different parts of the city as they were on duty or on their way to work.
No one has claimed responsibility as in the case of all other killing incidents in the city.
Another Libyan soldier was shot and wounded and another escaped assassination and succeeded in wounding one of the assassins who were later arrested by the Libyan army and are now under investigation.
Source Tripoli Post
Instability in Hadramout continues unabated
Il movimento secessionista del Sud, Herak, continua a rimanere fermo nella sua richiesta di autodeterminazione e secessione, con una persistente campagna di disobbedienza civile che ogni settimana – ad Aden, Mualla, Mukalla e Lahji – viene repressa con la forza dalle armi. Nella provincia di Abyan e di Hadramout il quadro appare ancora più complesso, con i militanti di al-Qaeda nella Penisola Araba che mantengono alta la pressione sull’autorità centrale con attacchi quotidiani di cui è la popolazione locale in definitiva a pagarne il prezzo finale.
SANA’A, Dec. 4—New reports of armed clashes between state forces and alleged Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) emerged Wednesday morning in the Ghail Bawzeer district in Hadramout, according to officials. There were no reported deaths or injuries.
There are security personnel stationed all over the governorate, the Interior Ministry previously told the Yemen Times.
In Ghail Bawzeer, residents have been warned not to go out at night, said Mohammed Bawzeer, the editor-in-chief of the local Shibam Public Newspaper.
“Residents are dissatisfied with the presence of armed men and security forces. There is panic because of repetitive clashes and shootings,” he said.
“The entirety of Hadramout is tense,” said Colonel Hussein Hashim, the security manager of Sayoun in Hadramout.
A security analyst, Mohammed Al-Khalid, said efforts toward an ongoing security campaign in Hadramout will not be successful because it’s not comprehensive. He says those targeted by it—mostly AQAP affiliates—will continue to jump from one area to the next.
Elsewhere in the governorate, in the aftermath of a security campaign in Al-Shehr city that began two weeks ago, dozens of houses were destroyed. The city remains under a 9:00 p.m. to 6:00 a.m. curfew.
Markets close at 7:00 p.m., Mohammed Al-Qahoom, a local resident said. Everyone is doing their shopping in the morning, he added.
On Monday in Sayoun, another believed AQAP stronghold in Hadramout, Sheikh Sad Bin Harish, the head of Hadramout’s tribal federation in Sayoun, was killed by state forces at a checkpoint right outside the city.
According to local officials, Harish, who was travelling with bodyguards refused to hand over weapons his convoy was carrying at the checkpoint. Officials say Harish’s men fired first and a gun battle ensued. Seven, including Harish, were killed in the clashes and four injured, according to Hashim.
The Defense Ministry’s website published a statement immediately following the incident, saying that Habrish was a member of Al-Qaeda. Later, the ministry retracted the statement and apologized to tribes in Hadramout.
But as many predicted it seems Habrish’s fellow tribesmen may seek revenge against the state for his death.
Hashim said the situation in the city remains tense and that security forces are expecting armed men in the area to mobilize.
Sabri Masoud, the head of Haq Organization for Human Rights in Seyon, said security forces have withdrawn from four security checkpoints to avoid clashes. Hashim did not confirm this. But, Masoud says tribesmen are coming from districts outside of Sayoun to avenge the sheikh’s death.
“They are coming to Seyon to agree on how to respond to Habrish’s murder,” he said.
Source Yemen Times
Syria jihadists kidnap 50 Kurds: activists
BEIRUT: Jihadists in northern Syria have kidnapped more than 50 Kurds in the past three days, in the second such case of mass hostage-taking since July, a monitoring group said Thursday.
The kidnappings come months into major battles for control of several parts of northern Syria that have pitted Kurdish fighters against jihadists, chiefly the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL).
“In the past three days, ISIL has kidnapped at least 51 Kurds in the towns of Minbej and Jarablus,” said the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights.
Among the hostages were nine children and a woman, said the Britain-based group, adding that there was no information on where they had been taken.
Minbej and Jarablus are located in Aleppo province, which is home to a Kurdish minority.
The kidnappings come weeks after Kurdish fighters further east, in majority Kurdish areas, expelled jihadists after battles that lasted several months.
In response, the jihadists have imposed a siege on Kurdish areas of Aleppo, where Kurdish fighters are weaker, said Observatory director Rami Abdel Rahman.
In July, ISIL kidnapped some 200 Kurdish civilians from the Kurdish towns of Tal Aran and Tal Hassel also in Aleppo province. Only a few of those hostages have since been released, the Observatory says.
was Arafat killed?
WhyIl problema non è tanto se Arafat è stato assassinato, quanto piuttosto perché? E chi si é avvantaggiato dalla sua uccisione?
On November 7, Raanan Gissin commented on the instructions given by the then PM Ariel Sharon in 2002, to the effect that “everything [must] be done to ensure that Arafat… was not killed by our soldiers,” the statement is correct but also misleading as to Israel’s responsibility for Arafat’s death. The Swiss team has concluded that polonium 210 was the weapon and in Francois Bochud’s words the “results reasonably support the poisoning theory.” Although recent French medical reports suggested otherwise and that he died of natural causes, yet we are left to ponder the reasons and the hands that carried out the murder not whether it was a murder. The question is why and what interests were served by killing Arafat?
Oslo, Arafat and ending the PLO
To understand the decision-making process that led to Arafat’s murder, we must go back to the events that culminated into the Oslo Accords; the assassination of Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin; and the political re-emergence of Sharon after a prolonged absence which was the final nail in the “peace process coffin”. From the beginning of the “peace process”, Israel’s leadership moved to create “facts on the ground” in an attempt to prejudice final negotiations and to strengthen the hold of settlers in the West Bank.
Israel had a deep mistrust of Arafat and the PLO. It attempted to eliminate both in the past. For Arafat, the engagement in peace negotiations was a strategic decision taken at a time of changing regional and global power structures. He believed in resistance and that it should always be an option independent of negotiations until the occupation is ended. Yet in this process Israel wanted Arafat to use his power to provide security for the settlements and settlers while they both expanded throughout the negotiations, an untenable position for the Palestinian leadership.
In this context, Israel understood and needed Arafat since he was not a regular figure, but rather an embodiment of the Palestinian struggle in his persona, history, dress and political machination. He was the bridge between all Palestinian factions and despite his best efforts to maintain control and discipline post-Oslo, Israel’s strategy at fragmenting the PLO and penetrating its inner leadership circle in the Occupied Territories was gaining traction. Arafat’s hold on power levers was the only remaining obstruction.
In reality, the PLO was the major challenge to Israel since it represented the Palestinians’ collective claims and had an effective global footprint. I do have long standing and extensive critique of the PLO.This, however, should not be confused with recognising the importance and the role it played across the globe, managing to create a state of Palestine without a territory – a monumental feat if one considers the obstacles.
Arafat entered the “peace process” in a very weak position with limited or no Arab support, and a changing regional and global strategic map. One has to see the signing of Oslo as his way of getting back into centre stage and forcing Palestine on the international agenda. However, it was a strategic miscalculation to trust the US in the search for a Palestinian state. The Oslo agreement ended the PLO as an international body and transformed it into an authority responsible for the Palestinians under occupation. Thus the global challenge posed by the PLO was eliminated and what remained was subject to direct Israeli control, if not employed by it. One Israeli aim in the “peace process” was to decapitate the PLO and to end the Palestinian political structure, narrowing the scope of legal claims against it.
Al-Aqsa intifada and isolating Arafat
On September 28, 2001, the Second Intifada erupted after Ariel Sharon’s visit to Al-Aqsa compound with over 1000 Israeli soldiers. The visit was the needed spark for a ticking bomb emerging from unfulfilled expectations and the Palestinians’ loss of land since the signing of Oslo. The response from Israel was massive and violent, especially after the highly contentious election that brought Ariel Sharon to the PM.
Arafat became a persona non grata not welcomed in diplomatic gatherings, while the newly empowered PM Mahmoud Abbas was invited to meetings with President Bush and Arab leaders at the World Economic Forum. While Sharon was called a “man of peace” by President Bush, Arab leaders had no objections to Arafat’s isolation. Certainly, the train of Arab normalisation has left the station and Arafat was no longer welcome on it.
Why kill Arafat?
After the First Gulf War, a new order emerged that witnessed normalisation of relations between Arab and Muslim states and Israel, cooperation in intelligence and military training, economic investment and projects with the Palestinian Authority, Egypt, Jordan, Indonesia, US, Europe and Gulf States that produced a new elite connected to and ready to defend this order and its interests in it.
In addition and a very important fact is that Sharon, the US and the Arab world operated in a post 9/11 logic and a changing global landscape with Arafat being a relic from a distant political past. The “new” order in the Arab world supported invading Iraq, opened torture centres for rendition and linked its security, economic and political elites to Israel. Arafat was the odd man in the mix. For him, Palestine was a real cause and not a mere tool to dispense with for a new free trade zone, a Most Favorite Nation clause or sweat shops for products to be sold at Macy’s.
The new alignment moved swiftly to factor Arafat out and I believed in 2002 that his days were numbered and that the search for a replacement was underway. More importantly, Israel managed to divide the Palestinian national body and fragmented the consensus on the touchstone issues that defined the cause since the 1948. At best, the current Palestinian political structure is a hostage to Israel’s occupational forces, and at worst it has been transformed into a platform for paid employees empowered to protect the settlements from the anger of the Palestinians.
What Arafat had was his signature, and as soon as it was delivered in 1993, the execution countdown was under way. Indeed, what was left was the how and when, not the if. Arafat’s nationalist credentials were a threat not to be left to circumstances or allowed to reconstitute. Arafat was killed because he was too nationalist for his own good and too aware of the historical and religious significance of Palestine to accept being a chief in a new colonial plantation.
The hands that delivered the venom were ready to serve in a Palestinian Bantustan connected to the neoliberal Arab and Muslim order, with all its glitter and wealth. For sure, the actual hands that placed the polonium for Arafat’s consumption are Palestinian belonging to the inner circle but the execution warrant can be traced to Sharon, Israel and the host of players in the new Arab order that have too much invested to worry about the life of one old man or Palestine for that matter.
Source:
Al Jazeera
|
Hassan Hawlo al-Lakiss: Israele o Al-Qaeda?
Hezbollah ha annunciato oggi l’uccisione di un suo leader nei pressi di Beirut accusando Israele. “La resistenza islamica annuncia la morte di uno dei suoi leader, Hassan Hawlo al-Lakiss, assassinato nei pressi di casa sua nella regione di Adath”, ad est di Beirut, ha annunciato la tv del movimento sciita, Al Manar.
”L’accusa diretta e’ rivolta contro il nemico israeliano, che ha tentato di eliminare il nostro fratello martire piu’ volte e in diversi luoghi, ma i cui tentativi erano falliti fino a questa mattina: il nemico deve assumersi la piena responsabilita’ e le conseguenze di questo crimine ignobile”, ha precisato il comunicato di Hezbollah.
Nei giorni scorsi, un attentato contro l’ambasciata dell’Iran a Beirut, che sorge in un quartiere a maggioranza sciita e sotto il controllo di Hezbollah, ha provocato 23 morti e piu’ di 140 feriti.
In seguito all’attentato all’ambasciata iraniana a Beirut, Al-Qaeda ha annunciato che ”ci saranno ulteriori attacchi” finche’ Hezbollah, alleato dell’Iran e della Siria, combattera’ a fianco del governo di Damasco e ”finche’ non saranno liberati i prigionieri delle brigate Azzam in Libano”. (fonte AFP).
You know you’ve made some bad life decisions when you’re involved in a globally-notorious terror group. Step into the shoes of one such man, Lebanese Hassan Hawlo al-Lakiss, who joined Hezbollah and rose through its ranks to become one of its top leaders. His path to prominence in Hezbollah wasn’t really all that difficult; he simply had to avoid getting killed or tasked with blowing himself up for his imaginary friend. As a Hezbollah military leader, al-Lakiss directed jihadist troop movements and consulted with Hezbollah leader Sayyid Hassan Nasrallah.
Israel, of course, wouldn’t put up with Islamic Hezbollah savages throwing rocks and shooting rockets. However, al-Lakiss didn’t directly antagonize Israel; he just told others to. Were his jihadist leanings what got him killed? His Hezbollah BFFs seem to think so. al-Lakiss was “assassinated” in a parking lot near his home a couple days ago by three masked gunmen. Hezbollah released this statement regarding his death: “Direct accusation is aimed of course against the Israeli enemy which had tried to eliminate our martyred brother again and again and in several places but had failed, until yesterday evening.”
“The Israeli enemy.” Totally the religion of peace right there. Despite the lack of evidence implicating Israel in the crime, the Muslims immediately blamed their eternal foes, the Jews. It is unknown who killed al-Lakiss, but even if Israel were involved, the terrorist kinda brought it upon himself for his fervently jihadist ways.
da Your Daily Muslim
Syria dispatch: from band of brothers to princes of war
The Free Syrian Army commander leant against the door of his four-wheel drive BMW X5 with tinted windows and watched as his men waded through the river on the Syrian border moving the barrels of smuggled petroleum to Turkey.
“There are many leaders in the revolution that don’t want to make the regime fall because they are loving the conflict,” said Ahmad al-Knaitry, commander of the moderate Omar Mokhtar brigade in the Jebel az-Zawiya area, south-west of Idlib city. “They have become princes of war; they spend millions of dollars, live in castles and have fancy cars.”
At the beginning of the Syrian war, cafés in Antakya, the dusty Turkish town on the border with Syria, was alive with talk of revolution.
Rebel commanders were often seen poring over maps discussing the next government target. Almost three years later the fight against Bashar al-Assad is long forgotten. Discussion now surrounds fears of the growing power of al-Qaeda’s Syrian outfit, the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, and the criminality and corruption that grips rebel-held areas.
Syria’s north has been divided into a series of fiefdoms run by rival warlords.
With no overarching rule of law, every city, town and village comes under the control of a different commander. A myriad of checkpoints are dotted across the provinces: there are approximately 34 on the short road from the Turkish border to Aleppo alone. It is a dog-eat-dog existence, where men vie for control of territory, money, weapons and smuggling routes; it is, disgruntled civilians say, a competition for the spoils of war.
“I used to feel safe travelling around Aleppo and in [the neighbouring] Idlib province,” said one Aleppo resident who works with a local charity to distribute food to civilians in the area. “Now I am afraid to leave the street outside my home. Every time you move you risk being robbed, kidnapped, or beaten. It all depends on how the men on the checkpoints you are crossing feel that day.”Fuel smuggling has burgeoned into a massive business, where smugglers and fighters take oil from the country’s rebel-held fields in the north, crudely refine it and pass it through illegal routes along the porous border with Turkey. Some rebel brigades have given up the fight against the regime entirely to run the operations that line their own pockets; others are using it
to fund their military actions, locals explained.
Some fighting groups manage the transfer of crude oil from the field to the refinery and then to the border, others have simply set up checkpoints that impose levies on smuggler gangs.
“Three years ago the rebels really wanted to fight the regime,” said Ahmed, an opposition activist living in Raqqa, close to the country’s oil repositories.
“But then the FSA started to control the borders and the fuel. After that it changed from a revolution to a battle for oil. I know rebel groups from Aleppo and Deir Ezzor, and even from Homs in the south of the country, that come here to get a share of the spoils.”
The West has long viewed the FSA as its best ally in the melee of fighting groups in Syria. Western diplomats have worked hard to promote the idea of a command and control structure in which a “Supreme Military Council” provides supplies and orders to outfits on the ground.
The CIA was part of an “operations room” designed to ensure the weapons supplied by Gulf sponsors and channelled through Turkey went to Western-friendly, FSA-affiliated fighters. The United States has even offered limited non-lethal military support in the form of thousands of food packs.
But competition between the main proxy backers of the FSA, Qatar and Saudi Arabia, the lack of a real military commitment from Western powers and chronic infighting from the outset sent the FSA into decline before it had been even been properly formed. Lacking financial and military support, or a clear strategy, groups in the north began to fragment. Men and weapons seeped away to the better organised, better funded Islamist groups, allowing al-Qaeda to strengthen its foothold in Syria.
Mahmoud, a rebel fighter from Jisr al-Shugour in Idlib, detailed the painful decline of his fighting unit. It is a story oft repeated across northern Syria. “We joined the revolution when men only had hunting shotguns to defend their villages. In the first months we liberated our town, took terrain and we were happy, we had a case to fight the regime. We were bringing freedom to our people,” he said.
He recalled how his comrades had planted home-made roadside bombs at the entrances to their town to block the regime’s tanks. “Back then we were a group of brothers, not officers with soldiers, leaders with their men. We were friends,” he said.
In April this year, the mood started to turn. “People arrived who were not with the revolution, they were only interested in selling guns,” he said. “They called themselves FSA, but they had no interest in fighting Assad. They seized areas that were already free of the regime and set up checkpoints on roads there and started charging people for access.
“Some of the men in my brigade started working with them.”
One officer, Ahmed Hamis, had been a representative in the Supreme Military Council for the Jisr al-Shugour area in Idlib province and had fought honestly against the regime, Mahmoud said. “Then a foreign sponsor started supporting him with money and weapons. He broke away to form a small gang.
“He has a lot of weapons but he hasn’t run one battle against the regime. He has no time for that because he has his own business, smuggling diesel and setting up checkpoints to levy taxes,” he said. “He also deals in kidnappings. If they catch a government soldier they’ll sell him back to his family.”
With little practical support coming from the Supreme Military Council, Mahmoud’s group started to falter. “Because we were not thieving, we had no money to operate. Many of our men had to leave to find jobs. We were weak and eventually we had to disband,” he said.
“My commander had been one of the first people to defect from the Syrian army. But now we don’t have any mission, and we don’t have any soldiers for fighting. My commander keeps asking his fighters to come back. He is desperate.”
At least 85 per cent of the fighting groups he used to know have started smuggling oil and cars, he said. Many had also turned to exploiting the finances of sponsors funding the war against Assad. Rebel groups film their military operations and post the videos on YouTube for foreign donors to peruse. Each outfit has a unit of “journalists”, men who follow them into battle armed with a video camera.
Back in the office they edit the footage, often putting it to music and stamping it with the group’s logo, before posting it online or sending it to their sponsor as evidence that the military operation they paid for had been carried out.
“Often our sponsors will give us money for a specific operation, so when we do it, we film it as proof that we have used their money well,” said a media officer with the Farouk brigade, one of the best-known rebel outfits in Syria, in their office in Reyhanli.
But FSA commanders are increasingly using this to line their own pockets, focusing more on getting the sponsor’s funds than on the military operations, civilians and rebel commanders have said.
Rebels across the region expressed anger at the battle of Wadi Deif, a six-month siege of a huge military base which ended with the government retaining control of it.
That siege was led by Jamal Maarouf, a former handyman and one of the most powerful rebel commanders in Idlib province, but many other rebel outfits participated. Men who were in the battle told The Sunday Telegraph that their commanders had not wanted to end the battle because it was too profitable.
“Funds poured in from the Gulf states and Saudi Arabia,” said one fighter who asked not to be named. “And the siege itself made money: commanders were taking bribes from the Syrian regime to allow the regime to send food supplies to its men inside.”
For several months, foreign backers sent money and weapons to help finish the battle at Wadi Deif. It became, as one rebel put it, “like a like a chicken producing golden eggs”.
Mr Knaitry said: “We try not to talk about it about it because we don’t want our people to lose hope. But they became merchants with the martyr’s blood.”
Suddenly many of the fighters bought new homes, and started flashing more money. One man said of Jamaal Marouf: “He had nothing before the revolution, now he drives around in his personal bullet proof car.”